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STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: HOW THE NCAA AND EA SPORTS MAY 
HAVE VIOLATED ANTITRUST AND RIGHT OF PUBLICITY LAWS TO 
MAKE A PROFIT AT THE EXPLOITATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE 
AMATEURISM 
Andrew B. Carrabis1
*A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as 
an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the 
student body and, by doing so, retain a clear line of demarcation between          
intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.2
*Fundamental Policy and Basic Purpose, NCAA Manual 
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, America is a land of capitalism and prosperity, with corporations 
and associations in business to make money. Make no mistake about it, college 
sports are big business, and business is booming.  Today’s market for National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) licensed merchandise is a global industry 
that generates nearly three billion dollars per year in revenue.3  In addition, college 
athletic events are a multi-billion dollar industry.  Yet, the revenues from these 
commercial transactions are not always divided up in a proportional manner.4   
On May 5, 2009, concerned by the lack of disparity between the NCAA and 
private third party vendors such as Electronic Arts (EA Sports), former student 
athlete Sam Keller (Keller) filed a class action5 lawsuit (Complaint) in the United 
States District Court, Northern District of California, against the NCAA, EA 
 ________________________  
 1. Andrew B. Carrabis received his Juris Doctorate Degree, with Honors, from the University of Florida 
Levin College of Law.  At the University of Florida Levin College of Law, Andrew served as the Editor-in-Chief 
of the Journal of Technology Law & Policy, Executive Research Editor of the Florida Journal of International 
Law, Senior Executive Articles Editor of the Entertainment Law Review, and Research Assistant for the Center 
for the Study of Race and Race Relations.  Andrew is also a certified county court mediator and Guardian ad 
Litem for the State of Florida.  I would like to personally thank Professor Thomas Hurst for his guidance and 
expert tutelage in guiding me as I wrote this article.  I would also like to dedicate this article to my family, for 
without their love and support, I would never have gotten this far. Thank you Arlene, Vincent, Scott, and Hali. 
 2. NCAA, NCAA 2009-10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art 1.3.1, at 1 (2006), available at
http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-3934-2009-2010-ncaa-division-i-manual.aspx  (last visited Apr. 20, 2010) 
[hereinafter NCAA Manual]. 
 3. Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, “J.J. Morrison” and his Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 15 
VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241 (2008). 
 4. Hunter Howard, UNC.EDU, The Explosion of the Business of Sports in the United States, (1998),
http://www.unc.edu/~andrewsr/ints092/howard.html. 
 5. Class action status requires satisfaction of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  One or 
more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of fact or law common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; 
and (4) the representative will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.  FED. R. CIV.. P. 23(a). 
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Sports, and the NCAA’s commercial licensing arm, the Collegiate Licensing  
Company (CLC) (collectively, the “Defendants”).  The class action suit claimed 
that the Defendants and their co-conspirators restrained commercial trade by     
engaging in anti-competitive practices in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act,6
(the Sherman Act), and engaged in unjust enrichment through the nonconsensual 
misappropriation of a student athlete’s likeness which violated their right of 
publicity and was used in commercial transactions.7       
In particular, the allegations giving rise to the Complaint stem from the        
eligibility requirements that the NCAA imposes upon student athletes before they 
are permitted to participate in intercollegiate athletics.  Specifically, NCAA Form 
08-3a (the Form)8, which all NCAA student athletes must sign before they are 
permitted to participate in NCAA sanctioned events, requires student athletes to 
relinquish the right of publicity of their names and images in perpetuity.            
Furthermore, the Complaint alleges that through the use of these tactics in      
commercial trade, the NCAA and the CLC, in violation of federal antitrust laws 
and state right of publicity law,9 have engaged with EA Sports in a concerted 
commercial action which inhibits competition in the marketplace of former student 
athletes’ likenesses.
Since Keller’s filing, former collegiate athletes from across the nation have 
joined the class action lawsuit; most notably, former University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA) star basketball player Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr. (O’Bannon) 
(collectively, Keller and O’Bannon will be referred to as the “Plaintiffs”).10  On 
July 21, 2009, O’Bannon filed a complaint in federal court in the United States 
District Court, Northern District of California against the NCAA, CLC, and EA 
Sports claiming antitrust violations and misappropriation of his likeness in        
violation of right of publicity laws.11  The suits brought by the Plaintiffs both speak  
similarly to the same issue – namely, NCAA and EA Sports violation of antitrust 
laws through concerted action in their exclusive licensing agreements pertaining to 
commercial trade and the misappropriation of collegiate student athletes’ likeness 
by the NCAA and EA Sports in video games. In light of the similar questions of 
law and fact raised, on September 1, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate 
their trials, which was ultimately granted.12
This paper discusses (1) the background information of the NCAA, CLC, EA 
Sports, Keller, and O’Bannon; (2) the federal law antitrust provisions that will  
likely come into play regarding this consolidated class action lawsuit; (3) publicity 
 ________________________  
 6. 15 U.S.C. § 1; Passed by Congress in 1890 to promote fair trade. 
 7. Complaint at ¶ 14-15, O’Bannon v. NCCA, No. CV 09-3329, 2009 WL 2416720 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 
2009) [hereinafter Motion to Dismiss]. 
 8. Form 08-3a states “You authorize the NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host 
institution, conference, local organizing committee)] to use your name or picture to generally promote                               
NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities, or programs.” NCAA Form 08-3a, pt. IV, (2008)     
available at http://www.ukathletics.com/doc_lib/compliance0809_sa_statement.pdf  (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). 
 9. Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 15, supra note 7. 
 10. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7.  
 11. Id.
 12. Motion to Consolidate Actions, Keller v Elec. Arts, Inc., Nos. CV 09 1967, CV 09-3329, 2009 WL 
2920919 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009). 
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law as it applies to the misappropriation of student athletes’ likenesses; (4) the 
NCAA and EA Sports’ responses to the allegations in the Complaint; and            
(5) proposed resolutions of the case including an attempt to predict the future of the 
NCAA, and EA Sports video game industry, in a post Keller and O’Bannon era.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Keller 
Keller played NCAA football at Arizona State University as a quarterback in 
2003, and transferred to the University of Nebraska in 2006.13 Keller’s class 
action, antitrust lawsuit claims that EA Sports’ video games make illegal use of 
college football and basketball players’ identities in violation of the Sherman Act, 
Section 1, through an exclusive licensing agreement that EA Sports secured with 
the NCAA and its licensing arm, the CLC.  Keller argues that the NCAA condones 
the practice in violation of its own rules and in violation of antitrust laws in an  
effort to make a commercial profit.14
Additionally, through the ability to download rosters, coupled with the          
unidentified, but obvious likeness of the video game players that identically match 
their real life NCAA student athlete counterparts, Keller argues that there can be no 
misconception regarding the true identities of players in the EA Sports video 
games.15 Inter alia, the suit cites examples of actual college players’ heights, 
weights, hometowns, positions, jersey numbers, and other distinguishable         
characteristics matching those of virtual players on the same teams in the video 
games.16
With [the] rare exception, virtually every real life Division I football or       
basketball player in the NCAA has a corresponding player in EA [Sports] games 
with the same jersey number and virtually identical height, weight, build, and home 
state.  In addition, Electronic Arts matches the player’s skin tone, hair color, and 
often even a player’s hairstyle.17
Furthermore, Keller’s suit alleges EA Sports’ video games even match       
idiosyncratic preferences such as wristbands, headbands, facemasks, and visors.18
The suit goes on to state EA Sports, the second largest video game publisher in 
the world, also allows customers to upload players’ names directly into the video 
games to further identify the collegiate players.19  Keller claims that because the 
NCAA has rights in perpetuity to images of him during his collegiate career, the 
 ________________________  
 13. Steve Wieberg, Ex-QB Sues NCAA, EA Sports Over Use of Athletes’ Likenesses, USATODAY.COM,
May 7, 2009, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2009-05-07-keller-ncaa-easports law-
suit_N.htm. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id.  It is worth noting that EA Sports only restriction in the likeness of the players in their video games 
is that they may not use their actual last names on the back of the jerseys. Id.
 16. Id.
 17. Id.
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NCAA, along with its co-conspirators, fix the price for the use of his image at   
“zero.”20  Lastly, Keller seeks to represent all NCAA football and basketball    
players featured in EA Sports’ NCAA video games.21
B. O’Bannon
Another prominent former NCAA student athlete22 to file suit against the 
NCAA and EA Sports, and who has now consolidated lawsuit claims with Keller, 
is Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr.  O’Bannon played NCAA collegiate basketball at 
UCLA from 1991 to 1995, and led UCLA to a national championship title in 
1995.23  As well as alleging antitrust violations under the Sherman Act pertaining 
to the NCAA and EA Sports’ exclusive licensing agreement, and violations of right 
of publicity laws through misappropriation of his likeness, O’Bannon is also suing 
the NCAA over the use of his image in reruns of basketball games on television 
networks.24
Currently, the NCAA bars current and former student athletes from receiving 
compensation for NCAA licensed products.  These products generate roughly three 
billion dollars per year.25 While O’Bannon is suing on the same grounds as Keller, 
there is a distinct difference between these two lawsuits.  Current NCAA players 
are not a part of O’Bannon’s class action lawsuit.26 O’Bannon has stated, “[w]hen 
you’re in school you’re obligated to live up to your scholarship.  But once you’re 
done, you physically, as well as your likeness, should leave the university and the 
NCAA.”27
O’Bannon’s class action of plaintiffs only includes former NCAA football and 
basketball players whose images and likenesses have been commercially licensed 
under the exclusive licensing agreement between the NCAA and EA Sports.28  If 
you are one of the few unlucky NCAA players whose likeness is not similar in the 
EA Sports video game to your real life statistics (such as height, weight,            
hometown), then you are not part of O’Bannon’s lawsuit. While O’Bannon’s 
lawsuit targets former NCAA student athletes and excludes current student       
 ________________________  
 20. O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190 slip op. at *2. (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
 21. Complaint at ¶ 58, Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. CV 09-1967, 2009 WL 1270069 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 
2009) [hereinafter Complaint]. It is worth noting that the NCAA prohibits the use of a student athlete’s name to 
appear on the back of a jersey, video games included, and also regards the jersey number as not being significantly 
linked to the individual student athlete.  Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 268. 
 22. Craig Newsome, former NFL player and former Arizona State University standout has also joined the 
suit as lead plaintiff with Keller and O’Bannon. O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *2.  
23. Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Antitrust Case,
SPORTSILLUSTRATED.COM, Jul. 21, 2009, available at: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/ writ-
ers/michael_mccann/07/21/ncaa/index.html. 
 24. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7, at ¶ 149. 
 25. Id. at ¶ 36. 
 26. Id. at ¶ 43.  The trial court agreed there was enough commonality among the complaints for class action 
status, but also retained the right to bifurcate the trials on certain issues.   
 27. Street & Smith, Ed O’Bannon Files Lawsuit Against NCAA Over Use of His Likeness,
SPORTSBUSINESSDAILY.COM, July 22, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/131922 (last visited Mar. 
1, 2010).  Keller states the same claim as when NCAA student athletes are no longer subject to NCAA regulations. 
Complaint, supra note 21. 
 28. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7 at ¶ 1. 
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athletes, O’Bannon has taken steps to protect today’s current NCAA student 
athletes as well.  O’Bannon has requested a constructive trust be made available for 
current NCAA student athletes for their disposal once they leave college.29
In particular, Plaintiffs’ consolidated lawsuit stems from NCAA Form 08-3a, 
titled Student Athlete Agreement and will be discussed in more detail below.    
Suffice for now, Form 08-3a authorizes the NCAA to use a student athlete’s name 
or picture to generally promote the NCAA, and by signing this statement, the    
student athlete relinquishes in perpetuity all future rights in the NCAA’s licensing 
agreements with third parties.30 It would seem that O’Bannon is poised to take the 
position that Form 08-3a is a contract of adhesion with unconscionability at its 
core.  Student athletes are ineligible to participate in NCAA athletics without   
signing the Form 08-3a.  Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that by requiring student 
athletes to forgo their identity rights in perpetuity, the NCAA, through their      
exclusive licensing agreement with EA Sports, has restrained trade in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and, consequently, the NCAA has deprived Plaintiffs 
of their right of publicity.31  Unlike professional sports,32 which enter into licensing 
agreements with the players’ association for approximately $35 million per year 
thereby allowing EA Sports to use the professional player’s names, college sports 
video games use neither players’ names nor specific facial features.33  EA Sports is 
the single biggest licensee from the NCAA and the CLC and provides six figure 
paydays for some university member schools.34
Lastly, Plaintiffs take on a public policy jurisprudence argument concerning 
the NCAA’s determination to preserve amateurism.  In their briefs to the court, 
Plaintiffs state that in the past the NCAA has not paid current student athletes to 
preserve amateurism.  However, in Plaintiffs’ rebuttal, they state that once the 
student athlete leaves the school, that particular issue is now moot and the question 
should now become whether amateurism should still be at issue, and additionally, 
questions whether former student athletes should still be within the scope of      
protecting the idea of amateurism by prohibiting them from reaping any benefits 
from sports licensing agreements long after they have left the collegiate sports 
ranks.  
 ________________________  
 29. Id. 
30. See generally Street & Smith, supra note 27; see also Darren Heitner, 2 on 2: Sam Keller and Ed 
O’Bannon vs. NCAA and CLC, SPORTSAGENTBLOG.COM, July 24, 2009, http://www.sportsagentblog.com/ 
2009/07/24/2-on-2-sam-keller-and-ed-obannon-vs-ncaa-and-clc-with-ea-on-the-bench/. 
 31. Wieberg, supra note 13. 
 32. While EA Sports is obligated to pay for the use of professional athletes likeness and images in their 
video games, “in which players are identifiable by name . . . ,” there is no such obligation to pay student athletes 
for the use of their likeness because there is no clear identifiable marker of the student athletes in the EA sports 
video games.  Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 271-72. 
 33. Wieberg, supra note 13.
 34. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3. 
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C. The National Collegiate Athletic Association 
The NCAA is an organization run from the bottom up by its member schools 
and affiliates.  Membership is open to any duly elected, accredited four-year     
college or university.35  Active members have the right to participate in NCAA 
events, vote on legislation, and enjoy the privileges and benefits of membership as 
designated by the NCAA constitution.36  However, the main purpose of the NCAA 
is to govern intercollegiate athletics in a fair and safe manner, while promoting the 
clear demarcation between professional and amateur athletics.37  Today, the NCAA 
contains over 1200 educational institutions, athletic conferences, and other related  
organizations.38
D. The Collegiate Licensing Company 
The CLC facilitates licensing for NCAA events, including, but not limited to: 
17 bowl games, conference championship games, four Bowl Championship Series 
(BCS) bowl games, the BCS National Championship game, and other events which 
promote the NCAA through third-party distributors.39 In particular, the CLC     
performs two specific tasks for the NCAA: (1) protecting the amateur standing of 
its members’ athletes; and (2) obtaining the most lucrative deals for its members.40
Additionally, it is pertinent to note that the licensing rights contracted by the CLC 
are separate from the licensing rights granted by the individual colleges and      
universities.41 In sum, the CLC is the one-stop marketing and licensing shop for 
the marketing and licensing of NCAA products to third-party companies through 
exclusive licensing agreements.  Exclusive licensing agreements are contracts in 
which one company contracts with another for the right to use the other company’s 
assets.42
In 2005, the CLC entered into an exclusive contract deal that effectively gave 
EA Sports the entire market for the development and distribution of interactive 
NCAA football and basketball video games.43  This contract allows EA Sports to 
identically replicate NCAA teams, stadiums, uniforms, and mascots within their 
video games.44 NCAA vice president Greg Shaheen’s comments exemplify the 
 ________________________  
 35. NCAA Manual, supra note 2, at art. 3.02., 3.1. 
 36. Id.
 37. Id. at art. 12.01, 12.02; see also Aaron Brooks & David Davies, Exploring Student-Athlete            
Compensation: Why the NCAA Cannot Afford to Leave Athletes Uncompensated, 34 J.C. & U.L. 747 (2008). 
 38. Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?
86 OR. L. REV. 329, 334 (2007). 
 39. The Collegiate Licensing Company, NCAA/Bowl/Conference Licensing, CLC.com,       
http://www.clc.com/clcweb/publishing.nsf/Content/championship+licensing.html. 
 40. Andy Latack, Quarterback Sneak, LEGAL AFF., January/February 2006, at 70, available at 
http://www.legal affairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/review_latack_janfeb06.msp. 
 41. Id.
 42. Liron Offir, Monopolistic Sleeper: How the Video Game Industry Awoke to Realize that Electronic Arts 
was Already in Charge, 8 DUQ. BUS. L. J. 91, 97 (Spring 2006). 
 43. Id.
 44. Id. 
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nature of the deal with EA Sports when he stated that “[the deal with EA] gives us 
a unique branding platform and access to a wide demographic.”45   
In 2007, the sports marketing leader IMG Worldwide, bought the three billion 
dollar per year generating giant named CLC.46 The revenue generated by the 
NCAA through the use of former athletes’ images and exclusive licensing    
agreements come from a variety of mediums such as player footage from television 
broadcasts, sales to corporate third-party companies, photos, trading cards, apparel, 
rebroadcasts of classic games, posters, and video games. 
In sum, in exchange for a share of the profits from video games, the CLC has 
granted EA Sports the exclusive right to reproduce the stadiums, uniforms, and 
mascots of the NCAA member schools thereby shutting out any authentic        
competition to EA Sports in the collegiate video game industry.47
E. EA Sports 
The video game industry boasted over $7.3 billion in sales in 2005 and sold 
over 248 million units of video games and accessories.48  Headquartered in     
Redwood, California, EA Inc. is the world’s leading independent developer and 
publisher of interactive gaming entertainment software.  EA Inc. publishes four 
logo brands and 33 product franchises.49  In recent years, particularly as it relates to 
the CLC, EA Sports has risen to the top of the video game industry by obtaining 
exclusive licensing agreements for the development of NCAA based video 
games.50  Consequently, EA Sports produced over three billion dollars in net     
revenues for the fiscal year of 2005.51  This figure represents almost half of the 
entire video gaming industry.52  With this exclusive contract with the CLC, EA 
Sports now has the opportunity to produce games with the actual players,       
something no other company is permitted to do.  One could infer that the NCAA 
and CLC chose EA Sports because they are a global leader within the video game 
industry, capable of generating tremendous commercial revenue for the NCAA 
while also prohibiting any third-party competition.   
 ________________________  
 45. Latack, supra note 40. 
 46. IMG Press Room, IMG to Acquire Collegiate Licensing Company, IMGWORLD,.COM, May 1, 2007,  
http://www.imgworld.com/press_room/fullstory.sps?iType=13708&iNewsid=423758&iCategoryID= (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2010). 
 47. See Latack, supra note 40. 
 48. Offir, supra note 42, at 91. 
 49. Id.
 50. Id.
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III. ANTITRUST PROVISIONS 
A. Sherman Antitrust Act, Section 1 
Conventional jurisprudence informs us that NCAA regulations generally fall 
into two categories: (1) rules promulgated to preserve and promote amateurism; 
and (2) other regulations which serve more economic purposes.53  Antitrust laws 
serve the policy purpose of preserving the notion that without competition,      
products will be inferior and will not develop to their full potential.54  However, 
EA Sports is free to create NCAA football and basketball video games for the   
video game marketplace without any competition or interference from third-party     
competitors to help stimulate competition and fully develop programs.55  Prior to 
the 1984 case of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma
(Regents),56 courts usually took a hands-off approach when it came to the NCAA, 
and were dismissive of the alleged violations of antitrust laws pertaining to the 
NCAA’s noncommercial objectives.57  In particular, prior cases such as Banks v. 
NCAA58 and Regents, established that the NCAA does not violate the Sherman Act 
by merely promulgating regulations that further the NCAA’s purposes of 
promoting fair competition and amateurism.  Regents is critically important      
because it changed the prior history of hands-off jurisprudence by federal courts 
and, through dicta, laid a new foundation for a dichotomous approach when      
applying antitrust law to the NCAA.   
Regents dealt with a plan by the NCAA to limit the number of games each 
member school could televise, and further implemented a procedure in which no 
member of the NCAA was permitted to make any sale of television rights except in 
accordance with the NCAA plan.  In Regents, the Supreme Court determined that 
the NCAA is not a single entity and antitrust laws apply to the collective actions of 
 ________________________  
 53. Lazaroff, supra note 38, at 329; see also Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 379-83 (D. Ariz. 1983). 
 54. Offir, supra note 42, at 114. 
 55. Id.; see also Christopher L. Chin, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA’s Unlawful Restraint of the Student-
Athlete, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1213 (Summer 1993). 
 56. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); see also Kristin R. Muenzen, Weakening it’s own 
Defense? The NCAA’s Version of Amateurism, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 257 (Spring 2003). 
 57. See Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (holding that an NCAA hockey player 
who received improper compensation was not appropriate for antirust analysis under the Sherman Act because the 
plaintiff is currently a student and not a businessman); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) 
(holding “there is a clear difference between the NCAA’s efforts to restrict the televising of college football games 
and the NCAA’s efforts to maintain a discernable line between amateurism and professionalism and protect  
amateur objectives of NCAA college football by enforcing eligibility rules”); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185-
86. (3d Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 459 (1999) (holding because NCAA eligibility rules are 
not related to the NCAA commercial or business activities, not intended to give the NCAA a commercial      
advantage in the marketplace, the amateurism rules are protected from antitrust scrutiny in order to preserve and 
promote fair competition); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding the NCAA’s
goal is to integrate athletics with academics and promote public interest in intercollegiate athletics);  see also 
Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (holding that when the 
NCAA acts in a paternalistic capacity the rules are immune from antitrust scrutiny when promoting amateurism 
and education). 
 58. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 908 (1992). 
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the NCAA and its member institutions.59  While the Court in Regents determined 
that the television plan by the NCAA was not in violation of antitrust laws, it did, 
however, open the gates for future courts to apply the rule of reason analysis to 
NCAA commercial rules propagated by the NCAA for economic benefit.60  In  
particular, the court noted that the joint action by the NCAA and its members on 
commercial economic matters should be dealt with under a rule of reason analysis 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, while other NCAA rules governing player 
eligibility and amateurism might be dealt with less scrutiny or may even be exempt 
from judicial review.61
B.  Modern Day Antitrust Law 
In the 1998 case, Law v. NCAA (Law),62 the Tenth Circuit determined that 
NCAA coaches were engaged in a trade or business and competition for their   
services and their compensation had been unduly restrained through the concerted 
actions of their employers and the NCAA.  In the 2004 case of Worldwide        
Basketball and Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA (Worldwide)63, the court again noted, in 
using the rule of reason analysis, that the “dispositive inquiry . . . is whether the 
rule itself is commercial, not whether the entity promulgating the rule is         
commercial.”64 Law and Worldwide demonstrate and stand for the proposition that 
when the NCAA implements rules for economic regulation (and economic gain), 
courts will tend to apply the rule of reason65 in their antitrust analysis so long as the 
plaintiff demonstrates certain elements.  First, the plaintiff must demonstrate the 
existence of a relevant market.  Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant has market power and actually has implemented anticompetitive effects 
within that market.66  If the plaintiff succeeds in this, the defendant must then offer 
probative evidence and proof that their rules offer procompetitive justifications for 
their actions.67  Thus, the common theme permeating through both Law and 
Worldwide is that when NCAA rules affect commercial trade and interstate    
commerce, and have a demonstrated effect on competition in cognizable industry 
markets, the NCAA rules will be subjected to federal antitrust litigation under the 
rule of reason analysis.  In sum, Regents, coupled with Law and Worldwide,
demonstrates that the NCAA commercial rules have promulgated into the        
marketplace. Therefore, if they depress precompetitive activity for commercial 
gain, they are ripe for reconsideration. 
 ________________________  
 59. Lazaroff, supra note 38, at 338-39. 
 60. Id. at 339-40. 
 61. Id. at 340; see also Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students be Paid to Play?, 65 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206 (1990). 
 62. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 63. 388 F.3d 955 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 64. Lazaroff, supra note 38, at 342. (quoting Worldwide, supra note 63 at 959). 
 65. Courts will apply a “quick look” rule of reason when the anticompetitive effects are sufficiently ob-
vious.  Id. at 343.    
 66. Id. at 363. 
 67. Id. at 357; see also Matthew G. Matzkin, Gettin’ Played: How the Video Game Industry Violates  
College Athletes’ Right of Publicity by not Paying for their Likenesses, 21 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 227 (2001). 
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While Regents, Law, and Worldwide deal with current student athletes, the  
current analysis of Plaintiff’s case, discussed below, falls under a different 
umbrella as we now deal with former student athletes who have left the NCAA 
collegiate world.  Thus, the regulations promulgated by the NCAA to protect   
amateurism are not applicable and should not apply.   
C. Per se Violations and the Rule of Reason 
The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prevent unwarranted and excessive      
restraints on interstate commerce and ensures that no single company will become 
a monopoly, controlling an entire industry or marketplace.68  Specifically, Section 
1 of the Sherman Act specially deals with anticompetitive practices within an   
industry.  “Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”69
A per se rule violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act includes violations that 
meet the strict characterization of Section 1 (“agreements, conspiracies or trusts in 
restraint of trade”).70  Furthermore, a per se violation requires no further inquiry 
into the practice’s actual effect on the market or the intentions of those individuals 
engaged in the practice because, on its face, the agreement appears to be one that 
would always threaten and restrict competition in the relevant market or industry.  
Conventionally, exclusive contract arrangements in the context of monopolization 
are not illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but instead are subject to 
scrutiny under the rule of reason.71 Courts have historically used the “rule of 
reason” as the standard applied to most anti-competitive practices to determine if 
the restraint in trade is severe enough to judge it to be illegal.72  Specifically, the 
rule of reason prohibits acts, contracts, and agreements which unreasonably operate 
to the prejudice of the public marketplace through burdensome restrictions on the 
rest of the competition within said marketplace and ultimately inhibit free        
competition.73
In sum, exclusive dealing contracts are not per se illegal unless they constitute 
a violation of the law on their face.  However, if it can be proven that the exclusive 
licensing agreements substantially inhibit and foreclose others from entering the 
marketplace to compete; then a violation of antitrust laws will be found.   
D. Clayton Antitrust Act 
While exclusive licensing agreements are addressed in the Sherman Act, these 
issues are also discussed under the Clayton Antitrust Act.74  It is worth noting that 
 ________________________  
 68. Offir, supra note 42, at 102.   
 69. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2009). 
 70. Id.
 71. Offir, supra note 42, at 92. 
 72. Id. at 103.   
 73. Id.
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2009). 
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there is a lesser burden to show antitrust violations under the Clayton Act than  
under the Sherman Act.   
[A] greater showing of anti-competitive effect is required to        
establish a Sherman Act violation than a Clayton Act violation in 
exclusive dealing or requirement contracts cases . . .  The existence 
of this heavier burden is rooted in the language of the two statutes; 
the Sherman Act speaks of actual restraints of trade while        
[Section] 3 of the Clayton Act speaks of effect of arrangements 
which may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a  
monopoly.75
In creating the Clayton Act, Congress’s policy intent was to reach conduct that 
is outside the parameters of the Sherman Act, but which Congress still deemed to 
substantially threaten interstate commerce competition.76  In order to bypass the 
rule of reason analysis in the Sherman Act, Congress specifically included the 
words “where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to 
create a monopoly,” thereby establishing a lower threshold for violations of the 
Clayton Act as compared to the Sherman Act.77  Procedurally, the Clayton Act 
empowers private parties injured by violations of the Act to sue for treble damages 
under Section 4 of the Act and injunctive relief under Section 16 of the Act.  On 
March 10, 2010, Plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint to allege federal 
law violations of the Clayton Act as well.78
E. Plaintiff’s Antitrust Prima Facie Case
1. Standing 
A plaintiff must have Article III and antitrust standing to sue under the    
Sherman Act.  In order to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that (1) he or she suffered a concrete particular injury; (2) there is a causal        
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) the injury 
will likely be redressed by a favorable decision.79  Additionally, a plaintiff        
asserting the antitrust claim must have antitrust standing separate from Article III 
standing.  In order to have antitrust standing, the plaintiff must plead and allege an 
antitrust injury.  An antitrust injury consists of “(1) unlawful conduct; (2) causing
an injury to the plaintiff; (3) that flows from that which makes the conduct        
 ________________________  
 75. Offir, supra note 42, at 107 (quoting Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 
1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
 76. Id. at 108.   
 77. Id. (quoting Clayton Antitrust Act). Plaintiffs also have the option to bring a cause of action under 
Section 43(a) Federal Lanham Act, but have not yet done so. 
 78. Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint at 14, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litigation, Case No. C 09-10967 CW available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/28209552/O-Bannon-v-
NCAA-Amended-Class-Action-March-10-2010 (last visited Apr. 19, 2010). 
 79. O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *6. 
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unlawful; and (4) that is one of the type that antitrust laws were developed to    
prevent.”80
Plaintiffs have Article III and antitrust standing.  Plaintiffs allege that           
Defendants’ actions, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, have caused 
them the deprivation of compensation through direct anticompetitive acts traceable 
to the conduct of Defendants in the collegiate licensing market by entering into an 
exclusive licensing agreement to monopolize the collegiate video game market.  
Arguably, by doing so, Defendants have decreased competition and Plaintiffs’ 
injuries may be redressed by a court of law.   
2. Violation of Sherman Antitrust Act, Section 1 
Under the rule of reason, the Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Defendants 
have enough power within the industry to restrain commercial trade.  As previously 
mentioned, EA Inc. is a multibillion-dollar company whose products account for 
over half of the share of the video game industry.81  Furthermore, they have the 
sole right to exercise the exclusive licensing agreement with the NCAA and CLC.   
Under the next step, if market power is found, as it will be found in Plaintiffs’ 
case, the court may then proceed under the rule of reason analysis to assess the 
anti-competitive practices of the defendant.82  Additionally, a defendant is deemed 
to have monopoly power in the relevant industry if the defendant has the power to 
control the prices of the product within the cognizable industry.83  Intent may be 
inferred if the defendant maintains their anticompetitive business practices in a way 
that inhibits potential competition.84
In the Plaintiff’s case, regardless of whether or not EA Sports is aware of the 
market power they wield within the video game industry, their ability to control the 
prices in the industry, by exercising their exclusive licensing agreement with the 
NCAA, makes them a formidable power in the industry.  Consequently, market 
power and a monopoly will be found to exist. 
In order to state a cause of action under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the 
plaintiffs “must demonstrate: (1) that there was a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy; (2) that the agreement unreasonably restrained trade under either a per 
se rule of illegality or a rule of reasoning analysis; and (3) that the restrain(t)     
affected interstate commerce.”85
With regard to element one, Plaintiffs allege that the NCAA is a bottom up   
organization run by its members under the rules and constitution of the NCAA.  
 ________________________  
 80. Id. (quoting Glen Holly Entm’t v. Tektronix Inc., 352 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 2003)).   
 81. Motion to Dismiss, supra note 7.
 82. Offir, supra note 42, at 104.   
 83. Id. See ELECTRONIC ARTS INC., NOTICE OF 2005 ANNUAL MEETING PROXY STATEMENT AND 2005
ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2005) (during the fiscal year of 2005, EA Sports controlled 63 percent of the sports video 
game market). 
 84. Id. at 106.  See also Michael Gerton, Kids’ Play: Examining the Impact of the CBC Distribution 
Decision on College Fantasy Sports, 11 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 153 (2009). 
 85. Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hairston v. Pac 10          
Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
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Additionally, Form 08-3a and Article 3.2.4.6 of the NCAA constitution mandate 
that each member will annually have student athletes sign Form 08-3a.86  These 
allegations adequately support an inference that there is an agreement among the 
NCAA and its members to administer the same rules on an annual basis.87
As to element two, the Sherman Act prevents only unreasonable restraints on 
trade. To determine whether an alleged restraint is unreasonable, a court may    
employ a rule of reasoning analysis, or a per se rule of illegality if the facts are so 
clear and anticompetitive on their face that no further inquiry is needed.88  Under a 
rule of reason analysis, a restraint is unreasonable “if the restraint’s harm to     
competition outweighs its procompetitive effects.”89 The rule of reason imposes an 
initial burden on the plaintiffs to show that restraint produces significant and     
unreasonable anticompetitive effects in the relevant marketplace.90 Plaintiffs    
identify the relevant market as the collegiate licensing market and that the         
Defendants, specifically the CLC, manage more than seventy-five percent of the 
relevant marketplace.91 Additionally, Plaintiffs plead that because of                  
monopolization and anticompetitive acts by Defendants, Plaintiffs are excluded 
from the market by the Defendants and overall, decrease the number of competitors 
in the market in violation of federal antitrust law.   
Accordingly, under a rule of reason analysis, Plaintiffs plead sufficient facts 
mentioned above to establish a prima facie case that Defendants violated Section 1 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act by unreasonably restraining commercial trade in the 
collegiate video game industry. 
IV. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
A. Background 
In 1878, Judge Thomas M. Cooley first discussed the tort of right of publicity, 
and coined the phrase the “right to be let alone.”92  In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and 
Louis D. Brandeis took Judge Cooley’s lead and produced the first extensive law 
review article discussing the tort law called the right of publicity.93  Warren and 
Brandeis’ article dealt with an individual’s right to be left alone, as opposed to the 
commercial exploitation of a person’s likeness, which today we think of as the 
“right of publicity.”  However, as time progressed and commercial transactions 
became more prevalent in society, consequentially involving the use of             
 ________________________  
 86. NCAA Manual, supra note 2, at 9. 
 87. Plaintiffs also plead agreements among the NCAA, CLC, and EA Sports were made in an effort to 
control the licenses and distribution of college athletes’ images and these agreements were brokered by the CLC 
for the benefit of the NCAA and exclusive distributors that do not compensate the plaintiffs. 
 88. O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *4. 
 89. Tanaka, 252. F.3d at 1063. 
 90. Id.
 91. O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190 at *5. 
 92. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE 
INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT, 192 (Callaghan & Co. 1878). 
 93. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4. HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
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professional and collegiate athletes’ likenesses, so did the right of publicity 
transform and evolve to cover new areas of protections.94   
B. Modern Day Misappropriation of Likeness 
In 1960, William L. Prosser wrote an influential article that would cement the 
law of the right of publicity into legal jurisprudence.95  Prosser described the tort of 
right of publicity not just as a single tort, collectively named the right of publicity, 
but rather as a set of four different, complex torts, which combined collectively to 
make up the tort of the right of publicity as we know it today.96   
Prosser defined these four distinct invasions of the right of publicity under the 
following umbrella: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his 
private affairs; 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the  
plaintiff; 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public 
eye; 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s 
name or likeness.97
Regarding the first three privacy torts, the torts of intrusion upon plaintiff’s 
seclusion, public disclosure of embarrassing facts, and publicity, which places the 
 ________________________  
 94. The history and transformation of the right of publicity law is beyond the scope of this article.       
However, in an effort to practice brevity, while also exercising thoroughness, the seminal cases evolving the right 
of publicity from a tort law of privacy to include a tort of misappropriation of likeness can be seen from the   
following cases: (1) Halean Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d. Cir. 1953) (holding public 
figures could receive money from authorized advertisements, and from other advertisements not authorized as 
well); (2) Motschenbacher v. RJ Reynolds, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that even thought defendant’s
significantly altered plaintiff’s images, the images were still identifiable and hence misappropriated); (3) Ali v. 
Playgirl, 447 F. Supp 723 (SDNY 1978) (holding a nude drawing that resembled the facial characteristics of boxer 
Muhammad Ali amounted to wrongful appropriation of his likeness for commercial value); (4) Carson v. Here’s
Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a public figure or celebrity’s right of publicity 
is invaded  wherever his identity is intentionally appropriated for commercial purposes, even by using identifying 
characteristics of the plaintiff, such as a catch phrase); (5) White v. Samsung Elec. Am., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 
1993) (holding that a robot that resembled Vanna White, under the totality of the circumstances, infringed upon 
her right to publicity); (6) Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, 34 Cal. App. 4th 790 (2001) (holding that news 
worthy articles or pictures are protected under the protection of the First Amendment); and (7) Gionfriddo v. 
Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400 (2001) (holding Major League Baseball’s posting of pictures of 
Major League Baseball players was protected speech as the MLB did not sell a product). 
 95. Anastasios Kaburakis ET AL, NCAA Student-Athletes’ Rights of Publicity, EA Sports, and the Video 
Game Industry, 27 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 20 (Summer, 2009) [hereinafter Kaburakis]. 
 96. Id.; see also Michael P. Acain, Revenue Sharing: A Simple Cure for the Exploitation of College    
Athletes, 18 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 307 (1998). 
 97. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
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plaintiff in a false light, the damage is largely mental and personal to the victim.98
However, the fourth tort of appropriation, appropriation of the plaintiff’s name or 
likeness for the defendant’s advantage, involves a plaintiff’s interest in property 
and is the commercial tort of the right of publicity which has taken the secluded 
right of publicity out of the private arena and into the arena of commercial      
transactions. This fourth tort is the right of publicity tort in which the Plaintiffs 
have brought their cause of action upon.   
Today, the right of publicity has become accepted as the inherent right of a 
person to control the commercial value, sale and use of one’s likeness and identity 
in the commercial marketplace.99  The first and only right of publicity case to make 
it to the United States Supreme Court was Zachini v. Scripps-Howard Broad Co.100
In Zachini, the Court held that the rationale for protecting the right of publicity is 
the straightforward rationale of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of one’s 
likeness.101  The court went on to state, in dicta, that no public policy or goodwill 
would be served by allowing the defendant to freely obtain some aspect of the 
plaintiff that would have commercial market value and for which consumers would 
ordinarily pay for the rights to own.102
Additionally, the right of publicity may be found in the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition within Section 46.  In said section, the right of publicity is  
defined as:  
One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using 
without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for       
purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules 
state(d) in [sections] 48 and 49.103
It is worth noting the broad interpretation under Section 46 of the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition allows plaintiffs to sue if the defendant’s use 
encompassed a variety of indicia of the plaintiffs’ identities, thus violating the 
plaintiffs’ right of publicity.104  Accordingly, Plaintiffs only have to show that their 
overall identities had been misappropriated in EA Sports’ video games, and do not 
need to prove that their names (which is not a factor) or likenesses were used  
without their permission.   
 ________________________  
 98. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 259 (citing Prosser, supra note 97, at 406). 
 99. Kaburakis, supra note 95, at 21.   
 100. 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law – Were Warren and      
Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)). 
 101. Id.
 102. Id.; see also Peter C. Carstensen & Paul Olszowka, Antitrust Law, Student-Athletes, and the NCAA: 
Limiting the Scope and Conduct of Private Economic Regulation, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 545 (1995). 
 103. Kaburakis, supra note 95, at 20. 
 104. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (holding that 
the right of publicity gives a celebrity the right to damages and other relief for unauthorized commercial        
appropriation of that celebrity’s photograph, independent of a common law or statutory right of privacy).   
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C. Plaintiffs’ Prima Facie Case Under State Law Right of Publicity 
Applying the Plaintiffs’ facts to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
elements, the Plaintiffs must prove the following: 
1. The NCAA and EA Sports used the Plaintiffs’ identity or 
likeness; 
2. The Plaintiffs’ identities have commercial value;105
3. There was an appropriation of commercial value by the NCAA 
and EA Sports for the purposes of commercial trade; 
4. There was no consent given by the Plaintiffs; and 
5. Plaintiffs have been damaged resulting in commercial           
injury.106
Based upon the above elements, the Plaintiffs have a cause of action against 
the NCAA and EA Sports for violation of their right of publicity.  First, there is no 
dispute that EA Sports has manufactured NCAA football and basketball video 
games.  Whether the video games portrayal of Keller and O’Bannon are substantial 
enough to warrant infringement of the right of publicity is a question of fact for a 
jury to decide, but nonetheless strong enough to get to trial on the issue.  However, 
in the complaints filed by Plaintiffs state EA Sports video games identically depict 
them on their corresponding school teams with the same numbers, and other    
identifiable indicia that they wore during their playing days.107
Secondly, Plaintiffs played for national universities in the two sports that    
generate the highest amount of revenue and the most publicity for their respective 
schools.  A quick search on the internet brings up a picture of O’Bannon cutting 
down the basketball net in UCLA’s 1995 national championship game.108
Thirdly, as mentioned supra, NCAA collegiate sports is a multi-billion dollar a 
year business and EA Sports has arguably misappropriated Plaintiffs’ commercial 
value for purposes of trade.  Included in this accounting are the millions of dollars 
that EA Sports generates yearly selling its video games.109
Fourthly, as the suit makes clear, there was no implicit consent given by   
Plaintiffs for the use of their images.  Form 08-3a states “You authorize the NCAA 
[or a third party acting on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution, conference, 
local organizing committee)] to use your name or picture to generally promote 
 ________________________  
 105. The identity must have value before the contested litigation and its association with the manufacturer. 
Pesina v. Midway Mfg. Co., 948 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
 106. Kaburakis, supra note 95, at 24. 
 107. O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *6. 
 108. See McCann supra note 23. 
 109. In 2005, EA Sports had a stock market value of over 16 billion dollars. David Whelan, Name        
Recognition, FORBES.COM, June 20, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2005/0620/113.html. 
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NCAA championships or other NCAA events, activities, or programs.” 110 Looking 
to the text of the form, Form 08-3a must be signed by the student athlete each year.  
Additionally, the Form’s ambiguous wording does not state that the NCAA student 
athlete releases his image or likeness for perpetuity.  In light of this, Plaintiffs 
should argue that even if Form 08-3a is not unconscionable as a contract of       
adhesion, Form 08-3a only applies on an annual basis, as it requires a student    
athlete’s signature annually.  Accordingly, once the student athlete leaves the 
NCAA, it does not follow that the student athlete’s image or likeness is still owned 
by the NCAA.  The former student athlete never signed another annual Form 08-3a 
after leaving college, and hence, should now own any use of his or her likeness by 
the NCAA once the student athlete has left NCAA jurisdiction.  However, this 
element of consent will be a passionately contested issue, and will be discussed, 
infra, with regard to the NCAA’s response under contract law.   
Lastly, it is quite clear Plaintiffs (and all former collegiate student athletes) are 
missing out on their piece of the pie of a commercial sales industry worth billions 
of dollars per year.  One of the main NCAA principles is “student athletes . . . 
should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial               
enterprises.”111  Ironically, in this regard, the NCAA receives a windfall and     
unjustly enriches themselves at the cost of student athletes by allowing the identity 
of nationally recognized schools, and their players, to be imputatively exploited in 
the commercial marketplace without implicit consent, resulting in pecuniary injury 
to the collegiate athlete.   
V. THE NCAA AND EA SPORTS RESPOND
A. Law of Contracts 
On February 8, 2010, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of California denied in part the NCAA and EA Sports’ motion to dismiss the 
Complaint.  With the Complaint now past the 12(b)(6)112 motion to dismiss stage, 
the NCAA and EA Sports will get the chance to argue their case on the merits.   
In Dean Prosser’s now famous law review article, he recognized that a          
defendant’s chief affirmative defense is the plaintiff’s consent to the invasion, and 
this consent will effectively bar the plaintiff’s recovery of any judicial action or 
remedies in law or equity.113  The NCAA and EA Sports will assert that Plaintiffs 
waived their right of publicity, granting the NCAA exclusive rights to license and 
control the image and likenesses of Plaintiffs by signing Form 08-3a.   
 ________________________  
 110. NCAA, Form 08-3(a) Academic Year 2008-09, available at http://www.ukathletics.com/ 
doc_lib/compliance 0809_sa_statement.pdf.  
 111. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 276 (quoting 2006-07 NCAA Division I Manual, art. 2.9, at 5 (2006) 
(purporting to protect amateur athletes from exploitation)). 
 112.  The Civil Procedure Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion is a motion which alleges that the plaintiff has failed 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), available at http://www.law.cornell 
.edu /rules/frcp/Rule12.htm (last visited on Apr. 19, 2010). 
 113.  Prosser, supra note 97. 
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“A contract is a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law 
gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a 
duty.”114  Additionally, in most instances, a contract may not be enforced without 
the presence of a bargained for legal consideration or detriment.  A contract of  
adhesion is defined as “a standard form contract prepared by one party, to be 
signed by the party in a weaker position  . . . who adheres to the contract with little 
choice about the terms.”115  Often a standardized, boilerplate contract, such as 
Form 08-3a, can create an inequitable situation where one party may impose terms 
on the other party who may have a decreased bargaining position with little or no 
power.  However, it is worth noting that adhesion contracts will not automatically 
be considered unconscionable, and not all unconscionable contacts are considered 
contracts of adhesion.116
1. The Doctrine of Unconscionability 
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) section 2-302 recognizes the doctrine 
of unconscionability and further states that if a contract is found to be                
unconscionable, it is unenforceable as a matter of law.117  However, technically, the 
U.C.C. only applies to the sale of goods in the commercial marketplace.  As a   
result, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 208, reflects the U.C.C.  
provision of section 2-302 by applying these principles to all contracts.  “The basic 
test [to   determine unconscionability] is whether, in light of the general          
commercial background and the commercial needs to the particular trade or case, 
the term or contract involved is so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract.”118  Additionally, 
as set forth in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,119 there is a two-part test 
stating that a finding of unconscionability requires a finding of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability.120  Procedural unconscionability considers whether 
there was an absence of meaningful choice for one of the parties and whether the 
party in the weaker position was oppressed and surprised by the terms of the     
contract.121  The second element, substantive unconscionability, focuses on the 
actual terms of the contract and whether those terms unreasonably favor one of the 
parties of the contract while considering if the terms of the contract are contrary to 
public policy.122
 ________________________  
 114.  Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 277-78. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
1 (1981). 
 115. Id. at 285 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (8th ed. 2004). 
 116. Id. at 287; see also Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of Redefining      
Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555 (2009). 
 117. U.C.C, § 2-302. (1998). 
 118. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 288 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (1998)). 
 119. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 120. Id. at 450. 
 121. In many cases, meaningful choice may be negated by a gross inequality in bargaining power.  Hanlon 
& Yasser, supra note 3, at 290. 
 122. Id.
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2. Unconscionability Doctrine Applied to Plaintiff’s Claim and Form 08-3a 
Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving both procedural and substantive            
unconscionability before a court will find a contract, such as Form 08-3a, an     
unconscionable contract of adhesion and therefore unenforceable as a matter of 
law.  Specifically, the Plaintiff must show that (1) an inequality of bargaining  
power exists between the NCAA and the student athlete; (2) there is a lack of  
meaningful choice by the student athlete; (3) supposedly agreed upon terms in the 
contract; and (4) terms that are unreasonably favorable to the institution.123
i. Procedural Unconscionability 
Form 08-3a is oppressive because there is no meaningful choice for the student 
athlete.  If the student athlete wants to participate in NCAA sanctioned events, the 
student athlete must sign Form 08-3a on an annual basis.  Form 08-3a will also be 
viewed as oppressive by the courts because of the gross inequality of bargaining 
power between a multi-billion dollar institution that has prepared Form 08-3a in 
advance and an arguably unsophisticated young person who has signed the form 
without the advice of counsel.  As a result, Plaintiffs will allege that Form 08-3a is 
a contract of adhesion since the form was signed by an unsophisticated student who 
did not know the full ramifications and consequences of a contract which releases 
all future rights of publicity in perpetuity, and ultimately, permits the exploitation 
of his or her identity.124
ii. Substantive Unconscionability 
Form 08-3a is substantively unconscionable because it is one-sided, overly 
harsh, and “the sum total of its contractual terms drives too hard a bargain” against 
the student athlete.125  NCAA rule 12.01.1 provides that only student athletes will 
be eligible for athletic participation and student athletes may not participate in 
NCAA sanctioned athletics without an annually signed Form 08-3a.  In sum, if the 
student athlete refuses to sign Form 08-3a, he or she will be ineligible to participate 
in intercollegiate NCAA sanctioned events, arguably losing his or her scholarship 
and the educational benefits that derive therefrom (which may also bring up      
constitutional issues beyond the scope of this article).126
 ________________________  
 123. Id. at 291; see also Vladimir P. Belo, The Shirts off Their Backs: Colleges Getting Away with Violating 
the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133 (1996). 
 124. “A contract is a promise or set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law is some way recognizes as a duty.”  Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 277-78 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981)).  A contract of adhesion is defined as “a standard 
form contract prepared by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position … who adheres to the contract 
with little choice about the terms.” Id. at 285. 
 125. Id. at 294 (quoting United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 206 (D. Mass. 
1998)). 
 126. It is worth noting that NCAA rule 12.5.1.1(h) states “any commercial items with names, likeness or 
pictures of the multiple student athletes … may be sold only at the member institution at which the student-athlete 
is enrolled … Items that include an individual student-athlete’s name, picture or lines … may not be sold.”  Under 
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3. NCAA and EA Sports Respond 
The NCAA and EA Sports will argue that when the student athlete signs Form 
08-3a, the student athlete agrees to abide by all of the NCAA’s regulations set forth 
in the contract and in the NCAA Manual and Rules.127  In particular, the NCAA 
Manual states only a NCAA amateur student athlete will be eligible for             
intercollegiate athletics and said athlete will lose such amateur status upon        
accepting payment in connection with advertisement, promotion, and sale of  
commercial products.128  The reasoning behind this policy argument, and Form   
08-3a, is that the NCAA has an ethical duty to preserve and protect amateurism and 
Form 08-3a accomplishes this task under a rule of reason analysis. 
B. First Amendment Protections v. Right of Publicity Exploitation 
Discussed more fully, supra, EA Sports will likely argue that since it does not 
provide third-party consumers with direct access to a student athlete’s name, 
images, or likeness through their video games, there is no violation of right of   
publicity laws.  However, a caveat to this is that EA Sports allows third-party   
consumers to download student athletes’ names, which then go on the back of their 
interactive video game jerseys.  To go even further, EA Sports contracts with    
announcers to use these names when the downloaded rosters have been             
implemented into the video game.   
To take a current example, a look at Tim Tebow from the University of Florida 
is illustrative of this ability.  As if the height, weight, and image were not         
identifying enough, before the downloadable roasters are implemented, when   
Tebow drops back for a pass, the announcer of the video game would say,    
“Number 15 drops back for a pass.”  However, once downloadable rosters are 
implemented, the announcer now says “Tebow drops back for a pass.”  This facet 
takes the identification of the supposed “unidentified” player into the arena of
obvious likeness and characteristic infringement.  As a result of the foregoing, 
Plaintiffs will likely be able to meet their burden and establish a cause of action 
under the right of publicity misappropriation, but not before their claim is balanced 
against First Amendment protections. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has mandated that a state of law right 
of publicity claim must be balanced against the protections and rustications of the 
First Amendment.129  There is a constant tension between the First Amendment’s 
goal of fostering and cultivating ideas, and the respect and protectionism of a    
this reading, the virtual likeness of the student athletes depicted in the EA Sports video games would constitute a 
finding that EA Sports, who has been officially and exclusively licensed by the NCAA, has commercially      
exploited student athletes’ likenesses without their consent. NCAA Manual, supra note 2, at art 12.5.1.1(h). 
 127. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 275. 
 128. NCAA Manual, supra note 2, at art. 12.5.2.1. 
 129. Zacchini, v. Scripps-Howard Broad., 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977). 
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public figure’s image or likeness.130  In determining whether an image or likeness 
is constitutionally protected, courts will consider “whether an intent to convey a 
particularized message is present, and whether the likelihood is great that the   
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”131  During the last decade, 
First Amendment jurisprudence has expanded significantly to cover video games132
and courts have categorically held that interactive video games have protection 
under the First Amendment.133  Recently, courts have also looked deeply within 
video games and have determined that the substantial creativity and expressive 
work within them falls within the parameters of First Amendment protections as 
well.134
However, many of the First Amendment protections afforded to video games 
deal with professional athletes and their claims that their right of publicity laws 
have been violated.  Most notably, in Cardtoons L.C. v. Major League Baseball 
Players Association,135 the Tenth Circuit noted professional athletes make a    
handsome living playing a sport they love and that they engage in activities that 
generate significant amounts of income.  Accordingly, the use of their name and 
likenesses do not impair the athlete’s ability to earn a living.  However, a stark 
distinction may be made with regards to NCAA amateur student athletes.  As   
mentioned prior, the NCAA’s stated goal is to preserve amateurism and, thus avoid 
paying student athletes.  In this regard, the fact that student athletes are not paid 
may actually work in favor of the Plaintiffs’ claim that the student athlete is 
entitled to a stricter right of publicity protection.  As a result, student athletes have 
a strong claim that their images and likenesses have been misappropriated to such a 
degree as to restrict them from bearing the fruits of their achievements and their 
right to profit from their endeavors long after they have left the NCAA and       
collegiate athletics.  EA Sports, though, will likely argue that student athletes   
benefit from and enjoy having their likenesses and even names on their worldwide 
selling video games.   
Lastly, it is worth noting that in addition to First Amendment preemption, the 
Commerce Clause and the dormant Copyright Clause arguably contradict the right 
of publicity scope extension136 and at the time of this article’s writing, there is no 
case on the books that directly deals with an NCAA’s student athlete right of    
publicity balanced against the First Amendment protections.   
 ________________________  
 130. Christian Dennie, Tebow Drops Back to Pass: Videogames Have Crossed the Line, But Does the Right 
of Publicity Protect a Student-Athlete’s Likeness When Balanced Against the First Amendment? 62 ARK. L. REV.
645, 668 (2009). 
 131. Id. at 668-69 (quoting Nordyke v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 2003), reh’g en banc denied,
364 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 132. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
 133. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959). 
 134. Romantics v. Activision Publ’g Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765-66. (E.D. Mich. 2008.); see also E.S.S. 
Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 
 135. 208 F.3d 885 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 3 (the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce 
… among the several states.”); see also cl. 8 (the Copyright Clause gives Congress the power “to promote the 
Progress of … useful Arts.”). 
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VI. REMEDIES
The remedies Plaintiffs may seek include monetary relief, disgorgement of 
profits from the wrongful use of putative class members’ images, and a permanent 
injunction prohibiting Defendants from using former student athletes’ images 
without valid consent.137  In reality, EA Sports releases a new edition of these 
games each year, and the older games rarely sell; therefore, it is plausible to state 
that the Plaintiffs will opt for the damages remedy option and ask for an accounting 
of EA Sports’ profits over the years that EA Sports has sold the video games.138  If 
able to prevail in court, Plaintiffs will be entitled to monetary relief in the amount 
of EA Sports’ revenue and gain.139  Additionally, if Plaintiffs can prove that EA 
Sports was put on notice of this exploitation, or acted in an intentional or willful 
disregard, Plaintiffs may be entitled to punitive damages as well.  The remedies 
offered in antitrust cases are designed to protect the market from anti-competitive 
practices, thereby attempting to ensure that the monopolization conduct is         
prohibited in the future.140  As can be seen from U.S. v. Microsoft,141 the remedies 
in an antitrust violation case may include employing procompetitive practices into 
the market place, terminating illegal monopolies, and denying the defendant the 
fruits of antitrust violating practices.142
VII. CONCLUSION
Student athletes possess both common law and statutory rights of publicity, 
and these rights should be defended in court.  EA Sports is the dominate player in 
the video game industry and engages in exclusive agreements which depress   
competition in violation of federal antitrust laws.  There is a clear absence in the 
NCAA constitution and bylaws that needs to be addressed regarding today’s 
modern technological and integrative world of interactive video gaming.  When 
this case proceeds to trial, a hotly contested issue will be Form 08-3a, which     
allegedly gives consent to the NCAA and EA Sports to use the student athlete’s 
name and likeness in perpetuity.  In response, Plaintiffs will submit to the     
aforementioned arguments of federal antitrust law under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, contract law pertaining to adhesion contracts of unconscionability, 
and a violation of right of publicity laws for commercial gain.   
The current state of antitrust jurisprudence, as it relates to the NCAA and    
student athletes, is unsound and in need of repair.  Judicial failure to recognize this 
 ________________________  
 137. O’Bannon, 2010 WL 445190, at *2. 
 138. Plaintiffs are also asking for injunctive relief to stop the NCAA and EA Sports from further violating 
antitrust and right of publicity laws in the future.  Additionally, as mentioned, supra, O’Bannon is also asking for 
damages and royalty accountings from the television broadcasts of the 1995 UCLA NCAA National             
Championship basketball game, and memorabilia sold in connection therein. 
 139. Hanlon & Yasser, supra note 3, at 276. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49 
(1995)). 
 140. Offir, supra note 42, at 92. 
 141. 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 142. 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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true monopolization by exclusive agreements between the NCAA and third-parties 
will result in a windfall and unjust enrichment for the NCAA, its member schools, 
along with EA Sports; while student athletes, of which the whole NCAA         
foundation is built upon, are left out in the cold.143  The NCAA and its exclusive 
license agreements should not be permitted to use a student athlete’s identity, 
image, or likeness without the student athlete’s consent when the likeness is used 
for commercial gain in the marketplace.  Federal courts should apply a rule of   
reason analysis to alleged Sherman Act violations by the NCAA particularly as it 
relates to the exclusive licensing agreement with EA Sports.  The NCAA bylaws 
are inequitable to student athletes by unfairly allowing the NCAA and private       
companies such as EA Sports to exploit student athletes for monetary gain.  It is 
time the NCAA realizes this and creates trust funds for future collegiate athletes 
once they leave the cell-like parameters of the NCAA’s constitution.  Until the 
NCAA changes its ways, many student athletes will have future claims of unjust 
enrichment and right of publicity causes of action against the NCAA.144            
Alternatively, the NCAA should assert a new position that third-parties such as EA 
Sports should not be permitted to profit off the images and likenesses of student 
athletes.   
If and when Plaintiffs prevail, there will be a catastrophic effect on EA Sports 
video games and the games’ interactive players.  EA Sports will be unable to enter 
into exclusive licensing agreements, thereby opening the doors for competition in 
the relevant marketplace.  The interactive video game avatars will be substantially 
scaled back to not encroach upon the student athletes’ likenesses without their 
permission.  More importantly, and of consequence to the NCAA, the NCAA could 
be required to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in damages since damages are 
trebled under federal antitrust law. 
 ________________________  
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